Module 01 of 10
Device Management
Is Not Privilege Control
Is Not Privilege Control
Intune is world-class device management. But "managed device" does not mean "privilege-controlled device." This module gives IT and security teams the precise framework to understand where Intune's scope ends — and where Privilege Manager's begins.
100M+
Devices managed by Intune globally
Microsoft, 2024
0
Fine-grained app elevation policies in Intune
By design — not Intune's domain
80%
Critical CVEs mitigated by removing local admin
Microsoft Security Intelligence
64%
MDM-managed orgs still granting local admin rights
Forrester Endpoint Survey
The Fundamental Distinction
Microsoft Intune
Device Configuration & Compliance Layer
Intune answers: is this device properly configured, patched, and compliant? It manages enrollment, pushes security baselines, deploys applications, and enforces conditional access to cloud resources. It operates at the device state layer — ensuring machines meet your baseline configuration policy.
Delinea Privilege Manager
Endpoint Privilege Control Layer
Privilege Manager answers: what can users and processes do on a compliant device? It enforces least privilege, elevates specific applications by policy, blocks untrusted executables, captures justifications, records privileged sessions, and audits every privilege decision. It operates at the process runtime layer — on top of Intune.
The Critical Gap Most Teams Miss The most common mistake in Intune deployments: teams achieve compliance reporting and patch coverage, then leave local administrator rights in place because "Intune doesn't give us a way to remove them without breaking things." That gap — between a compliant device and a least-privilege device — is exactly what Privilege Manager closes.
What This Guide Covers
Each module explores one dimension of the comparison. Modules 04–06 are the critical gap analysis. Module 08 is an interactive scoring assessment — answer 8 questions about your environment and receive a concrete recommendation. Module 09 is a printable full feature matrix for stakeholder conversations.
Module 02 of 10
What Intune
Does Exceptionally Well
Does Exceptionally Well
A precise and fair account of Intune's genuine strengths. These are not partial capabilities — Intune is the appropriate primary tool for each of these, and should remain so.
✓ Core Strength
Device Enrollment & Compliance Policies
Intune manages enrollment for Windows, macOS, iOS, and Android. Compliance policies define what a "healthy" device looks like — OS version, encryption, antivirus, firewall state — and Conditional Access blocks non-compliant devices from M365 resources automatically.
› What compliance policies check
Compliance checks include: minimum OS version/build, BitLocker (Windows) or FileVault (macOS) encryption status, Windows Defender/antivirus active and updated, firewall enabled, screen lock enforced, jailbreak/root detection (mobile), and custom compliance scripts. Non-compliant devices can be blocked, marked at risk, or quarantined from cloud resource access in real time. This is enterprise-grade compliance automation.
✓ Core Strength
Patch Management & OS Update Enforcement
Windows Update Rings and macOS Software Update policies push patches on a defined schedule with deferral and deadline controls. Patch compliance dashboards show fleet-wide coverage. Critical patches can be force-installed without user consent.
› Scope notes
Intune handles OS patching and Microsoft application updates natively and well. Third-party patching requires packaging Win32 apps for deployment or integrating with Windows Update for Business. For fully automated third-party patching with vulnerability detection, dedicated patch management tools complement Intune. But for OS-level patch enforcement across a Windows + macOS fleet, Intune is the right tool.
✓ Core Strength
Application Deployment at Scale
Intune deploys Win32 apps, MSI/MSIX packages, Microsoft Store apps, and LOB apps to enrolled devices. Required deployments push silently in SYSTEM context; available apps appear in Company Portal for user self-service. App detection rules confirm successful installation.
› The deployment vs. elevation distinction
Intune deploys an application to a device in SYSTEM context during provisioning. This is a fundamentally different action from user-level elevation. Once an app is installed and a user launches it, Intune has no mechanism to control whether that running process can acquire elevated privileges, spawn admin child processes, or perform privileged operations. Deployment is a provisioning control. Elevation is a runtime control. They require different tools.
✓ Core Strength
Security Baseline & Configuration Profiles
Intune pushes Microsoft Security Baselines (CIS-aligned), custom OMA-URI settings, certificate deployments, VPN and Wi-Fi profiles, and device restrictions. Configuration profiles ensure every enrolled device starts with a hardened, consistent baseline.
✓ Core Strength
Conditional Access Integration
Deep integration with Microsoft Entra ID enforces that access to cloud resources (Exchange, SharePoint, Teams, custom apps) requires a compliant, managed device. Combines device compliance signal with identity MFA for layered access control.
› Important scope boundary
Conditional Access MFA challenges users when they access cloud resources — when they open Outlook, authenticate to SharePoint, or launch a cloud application. It does not fire when a user right-clicks an application on their desktop and runs it as administrator. The cloud authentication event and the local privilege escalation event are two entirely different control planes. Endpoint-level MFA at the moment of elevation requires Privilege Manager.
✓ Core Strength
BYOD & Mobile Application Management
Intune's MAM policies and app protection profiles separate corporate data on personal devices. Selective wipe removes corporate data without touching personal content. Managed browser policies control data flow between corporate applications on unmanaged devices.
✓ Core Strength
Device Inventory, Endpoint Analytics & Reporting
Hardware and software inventory for all enrolled devices. Endpoint analytics surface startup performance, policy conflicts, and app reliability. Compliance reports show patch and posture coverage across the fleet. Strong operational visibility layer for IT teams.
The Right Framing for Stakeholders Never position this as "Intune isn't good enough." The conversation should be: "Intune manages the device state. Privilege Manager controls what users can do on those managed devices. They operate at different layers of the security stack, and together they provide complete endpoint security coverage." This framing is accurate, honest, and resonates with teams already invested in Intune.
Module 03 of 10
Where Intune
Reaches Its Boundary
Reaches Its Boundary
These limitations are not defects — they are deliberate scope decisions. Intune was not designed to be a privilege management engine. The following are areas where Intune's design intentionally stops short of what security teams need for full endpoint privilege control.
✕ Privilege Gap
No Fine-Grained Application Elevation
Intune cannot elevate a specific application for a specific user or group by policy. There is no mechanism to say "elevate only this verified application for members of the Finance team." The only path to elevation is granting local admin rights — or deploying in SYSTEM context, which is inappropriate for interactive user applications.
› Why this forces a bad trade-off
The situation IT teams face: User needs to run an app that requires admin rights. Options with Intune alone: (A) Grant user local admin — which creates exactly the attack surface you're trying to eliminate. (B) Deploy via Intune SYSTEM context during imaging — this doesn't help with runtime elevation for user-interactive tasks. (C) Have IT manually intervene for every elevation request — operationally unsustainable. Privilege Manager breaks this trade-off by enabling targeted elevation without admin accounts.
✕ Privilege Gap
No Process-Level Application Blocking
Intune does not natively block specific executables from running. AppLocker and WDAC (Windows Defender Application Control) can be deployed via Intune, but these are separate Windows technologies requiring significant policy expertise, are Windows-only, and provide no user-facing exception workflow or cross-platform capability.
› Intune EPM vs. a full privilege management platform
Microsoft introduced Endpoint Privilege Management (EPM) in the Intune Suite add-on. EPM provides basic application elevation on Windows only. It lacks: macOS and Linux support, multi-factor authentication at elevation, screen recording of privileged sessions, advanced filter options (parent process, command-line context), approval workflow integration with ServiceNow/ITSM tools, and a centralized exception management workflow. EPM is a start; PM is a complete privilege management platform.
✕ Privilege Gap
Limited Session-Level Privilege Auditing
Intune logs device compliance events, configuration changes, and app deployment outcomes. It does not capture: which applications a user elevated, what process tokens were modified, the justification a user provided for a privilege escalation, or a recording of what happened during an elevated session.
✕ Privilege Gap
No Mechanism to Remove Local Admin Without Disruption
Intune cannot remove local admin rights and simultaneously ensure all legitimate workflows still function. There is no discovery-to-policy mechanism. The result: most Intune deployments leave local admin intact because removing it breaks too much — and there is no Intune-native path to identify what exactly needs elevation before you remove it.
✕ Privilege Gap
No Endpoint MFA at Point of Elevation
Intune Conditional Access MFA triggers at cloud resource authentication — not at local privilege escalation. A user who is already logged in can elevate any process they have rights to without any additional authentication challenge. There is no Intune mechanism to require MFA when a user attempts to run a process with elevated rights on their endpoint.
✕ Privilege Gap
No Unified Privilege Control Across Windows + macOS + Linux
While Intune manages Windows and macOS devices, its privilege control capabilities are minimal on both platforms and entirely absent for Linux. A managed macOS device has no application-level privilege controls through Intune. Linux endpoints are not in Intune's scope at all.
The Compliance Paradox Organizations deploy Intune to harden endpoint posture — encrypting drives, enforcing patches, blocking non-compliant access. But compliance with HIPAA, PCI DSS, or FedRAMP requires more than device posture: it requires audit trails of privileged application execution, MFA at privilege elevation, and session recording. Intune delivers the device compliance foundation; it cannot satisfy the privilege control requirements these frameworks demand.
Module 04 of 10
Gap: Fine-Grained
Application Elevation
Application Elevation
The most operationally critical gap. Fine-grained elevation means: this specific verified application, for this specific user group, gets elevated rights — silently or with a prompt — without the user holding a local admin account.
The Elevation Spectrum
Intune: SYSTEM Deploy
Intune can install apps via SYSTEM context at provisioning time. This installs the app with admin rights at setup — it does not elevate the running application when a user launches it interactively. Not a runtime elevation solution.
The Gap
No Intune mechanism exists to evaluate an application launch, verify its identity by certificate and hash, and grant it an elevated process token — without the user being a local admin. This entire control class is absent.
PM: Policy Elevation
PM intercepts every process launch, evaluates it against ordered policies, and elevates the exact process token with exactly the rights needed. The user's account stays standard throughout.
Elevation Modes — PM Only
| Elevation Type | Microsoft Intune | Privilege Manager |
|---|---|---|
| Silent elevation (no user interaction) | NO No per-process elevation mechanism |
YES App elevates invisibly. Used for trusted LOB apps — user never sees a prompt. |
| Prompted elevation + justification capture | NO | YES PM dialog asks for a business reason from a curated list. Selection logged with process metadata. |
| Approval-gated elevation | NO | YES Requires manager or IT approval before elevation is granted. Time-boxed. Full approval chain logged with timestamps. |
| MFA required at point of elevation | NO Intune MFA is cloud-resource–gated, not endpoint-process–gated |
YES Duo Security, Microsoft Authenticator, or TOTP required before elevation is granted at endpoint |
| Publisher cert + SHA256 hash verification | NO | YES Combined filter: one changed byte = no elevation. Prevents binary spoofing or path-substitution attacks. |
| Parent process context filter | NO | YES "Only elevate if launched from this parent process" — prevents privilege abuse via script launchers. |
| Child process elevation scoping | NO | YES Control whether elevated rights propagate to child processes — critical for preventing privilege inheritance by malicious spawned processes. |
| Self-service exception request | PARTIAL Company Portal handles app requests — not runtime elevation requests |
YES User submits elevation request via PM block notification or portal. IT reviews with full app metadata pre-populated. |
Integration, Not Replacement Intune deploys the PM agent as a Win32 app to all enrolled endpoints. PM then controls what those applications can do at runtime. Intune handles provisioning and deployment. PM handles runtime privilege decisions. They work at different layers and reinforce each other.
Module 05 of 10
Gap: Session Auditing
& Forensic Visibility
& Forensic Visibility
Intune provides excellent device-level event logs. It does not provide the per-process, per-elevation audit trail that compliance frameworks require — or that incident investigations depend on when tracing what happened on a compromised endpoint.
Audit Trail Comparison
| Audit Capability | Microsoft Intune | Privilege Manager |
|---|---|---|
| Device compliance state changes | YES — Core Intune capability | N/A — PM operates at process layer |
| App deployment outcomes (per device) | YES | N/A |
| Per-application elevation events | NO — Not captured | YES — Every elevation decision, full metadata |
| Elevation denial and block events | NO | YES — With process hash, path, parent process |
| User justification text captured | NO | YES — Stored permanently with elevation event |
| Screen recording of elevated sessions | NO | YES — Policy-triggered, tamper-evident vault storage |
| SIEM real-time privilege event feed | PARTIAL — Compliance events only via Sentinel/Log Analytics | YES — All elevation, block, and audit events in real time |
| SOC alert on anomalous elevation spike | NO — No process-level visibility | YES — PM reporting dashboard + Defender/SIEM integration |
What PM's Audit Record Contains
Per-Elevation Log Entry
- Username and machine name
- Timestamp (UTC, millisecond precision)
- Process name, full executable path, SHA256 hash
- Parent process that launched it
- Policy that matched (or "no match — default action")
- Decision: elevated / blocked / allowed standard
- User-provided justification (if prompted)
- MFA completion record (if required)
- Screen recording reference (if triggered by policy)
Compliance Frameworks Satisfied
- PCI DSS Req 10: Audit trail of all privileged access — PM captures every event
- HIPAA Technical Safeguards: Monitoring and audit controls — PM session recording satisfies this
- SOX IT Controls: Evidence of who had privileged access and what they did
- FedRAMP AU-2: Audit event types including privilege function execution
- NIST 800-53 AU-3: Content of audit records — PM's log fields meet this requirement
The Incident Response Gap When a security incident traces to an endpoint, the first forensic question is: "What elevated processes ran on this machine in the 48 hours before the incident?" Intune's audit log cannot answer this. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint can partially answer it. Privilege Manager answers it completely — with every elevation decision, the matching policy, the process hash, the justification the user gave, and optionally a screen recording of exactly what occurred during the elevated session.
Module 06 of 10
Gap: Enforcing
Least Privilege
Least Privilege
Least privilege — giving users and processes only the rights they need — is the most impactful single endpoint security control available. Intune provides the device compliance foundation. Privilege Manager provides the runtime enforcement that makes least privilege operational.
Why Local Admin Persists in Intune Environments
Root Cause
The Cycle That Keeps Local Admin in Place
Security team says: remove local admin. IT says: it breaks App X, Y, and Z. Security acknowledges the disruption risk. Local admin stays. This cycle repeats every 18 months. Intune provides no mechanism to break it — there is no way in Intune to inventory what needs elevation and then selectively provide it.
› The full failure cycle
Phase 1: Mandate goes out — remove local admin from all endpoints. Phase 2: Pilot group loses local admin. Within 48 hours: three LOB apps break, VPN client can't update, legacy installer fails silently. Phase 3: Rollback. Phase 4: "We'll revisit when we have more time." Meanwhile: an attacker phishes a user who has local admin. Ransomware installs silently, establishes persistence, and encrypts the share drive. The tools to remove local admin safely existed — the organization just didn't have them deployed.
PM Solution
Discovery First, Removal Second
PM's audit-only discovery mode runs for 2–4 weeks, logging every application that currently requires admin rights — without enforcing anything. The output is a complete elevation inventory. Build elevation policies for each item. Then remove local admin. Users experience no disruption because their apps elevate by policy.
› The discovery-to-removal workflow
Week 1–4: PM in audit mode. Every elevation event is logged: app name, hash, user, machine, frequency. Week 5: Review inventory. Classify each item — Silent Elevation, Prompted Elevation, or Block. Build policies. Week 6: Enable enforcement on pilot group. Zero disruption confirmed. Week 7–10: Progressive rollout. Local admin removed from each group after policies verified. Result: Local admin attack surface eliminated. Helpdesk tickets for elevation requests typically drop 40–60% (structured self-service replaces ad-hoc calls). Audit trail now meets compliance requirements.
Least-Privilege Deployment Checklist
- ✓Deploy PM agent via Intune to all enrolled Windows and macOS endpointsWin32 app package for Windows; MDM profile or Jamf/Mosyle payload for macOS. PM and Intune coexist without conflict.
- ✓Run in audit-only mode for 2–4 weeks to build elevation inventoryCaptures every process that currently requires admin rights across the fleet. No enforcement during this phase — zero risk to operations.
- ✓Build elevation policies for every item in the inventoryClassify each: Silent (trusted, frequent), Prompted (periodic, needs justification), Approval-gated (sensitive, rare), or Block (unknown/suspicious).
- ✓Enable enforcement mode on a pilot group and verify zero disruptionSelect a representative group. All legitimate apps elevate by policy. Confirm with helpdesk that no unexpected friction is occurring. Adjust policies as needed.
- ✓Remove local admin rights from pilot group, then roll out progressivelyWork group by group — IT first, then power users, then standard users. The attack surface shrinks with each cohort completed.
- ✓Configure self-service exception workflow for new elevation requestsUsers who encounter a new unmatched application submit a structured request via PM portal. IT reviews with full app metadata pre-populated — no manual investigation needed.
Module 07 of 10
The Complementary
Architecture
Architecture
Intune and Privilege Manager do not compete — they occupy adjacent, non-overlapping layers of the endpoint security stack. Understanding the architecture prevents both tool redundancy and security coverage gaps.
// Endpoint Security Stack — Intune + Privilege Manager (recommended architecture)
Physical Endpoint / Operating System
↑ enrolled and managed by ↑
Microsoft Intune — Device Management Layer
↑ privilege layer deployed by Intune, operates independently ↑
Delinea Privilege Manager — Privilege Control Layer
↑ user identity and group policy targets from ↑
Microsoft Entra ID — Identity & Access Layer
Key Integration Points
Deploy PM Agent via Intune
Package the PM agent as a Win32 app in Intune. Deploy to all enrolled Windows endpoints as a required app. For macOS, deploy via Intune MDM configuration profile or alongside Jamf. Once deployed, PM registers with its own cloud tenant and receives privilege policies independently — Intune is only used for initial agent deployment.
Target PM Policies with Entra Groups
PM elevation policies can target Entra ID / Active Directory security groups directly. "Silently elevate the network diagnostic tool for members of the IT-Network group." Your existing Intune/Entra user organization drives PM policy targeting — no duplication, no new directory structure required.
Zero Conflict, Zero Overlap Intune's compliance engine evaluates device state: is this machine encrypted, patched, and policy-compliant? PM's policy engine evaluates process launch events: should this application be elevated, blocked, or allowed standard? These happen at entirely different system layers. Deploying both does not create duplicate agents, policy conflicts, or architecture complexity — PM adds a control layer that Intune has no equivalent for.
Module 08 of 10
Interactive
PM Needs Assessment
PM Needs Assessment
Answer eight questions about your organization's environment, risk profile, and compliance requirements. The tool scores your responses and produces a tailored recommendation on whether Intune alone is sufficient or whether Privilege Manager is needed as a complementary layer.
Environment Assessment
8 questions · ~90 seconds · Tailored recommendation
Q 01 / 08
Do any of your users currently hold local administrator rights on their Windows or macOS workstations?
Q 02 / 08
Do you manage macOS or Linux endpoints in your fleet, in addition to Windows?
Q 03 / 08
Is your organization subject to a compliance framework requiring privileged access audit trails — such as PCI DSS, HIPAA, SOX, or FedRAMP?
Q 04 / 08
Have you experienced a ransomware or malware incident in the past 3 years, or are you in a high-threat industry such as finance, healthcare, or critical infrastructure?
Q 05 / 08
Does your helpdesk receive recurring tickets from users requesting application installs or elevation for specific tools (e.g. installers, legacy apps, diagnostic tools)?
Q 06 / 08
Does your SOC or security team need real-time visibility into privilege escalation events at the endpoint for threat hunting or incident response?
Q 07 / 08
Do you have developers, engineers, or power users who legitimately need elevated rights for specific tools — IDEs, debuggers, network analyzers, build systems?
Q 08 / 08
Do third-party vendors or contractors need temporary elevated access to endpoints for remote support or maintenance activities?
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/ 8
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Module 09 of 10
Full Feature
Matrix
Matrix
A complete side-by-side capability reference. Use this in stakeholder conversations, security architecture reviews, and procurement documentation to precisely delineate the responsibilities of each tool.
Device Management
| Capability | Microsoft Intune | Privilege Manager |
|---|---|---|
| Device enrollment & MDM policies | YES — Core function across Win/Mac/iOS/Android | N/A — PM is not an MDM platform |
| OS compliance policy enforcement | YES — Encryption, AV, OS version, firewall | N/A |
| Patch / OS update management | YES — Update Rings + macOS Software Update | N/A |
| Application deployment at scale | YES — Win32, MSI, Store, LOB apps | N/A — PM controls running apps, does not deploy them |
| Security baseline configuration profiles | YES — Microsoft Security Baselines + custom OMA-URI | N/A |
| Conditional Access (cloud resources) | YES — Via Entra ID integration | N/A |
Privilege Control
| Capability | Microsoft Intune | Privilege Manager |
|---|---|---|
| Local admin removal with zero operational disruption | NO — No elevation mechanism to replace local admin | YES — Discovery → policy → removal workflow |
| Silent application elevation by policy | PARTIAL — Intune EPM add-on (Windows only, limited) | YES — Full, all platforms, all elevation modes |
| Prompted elevation + justification capture | PARTIAL — Intune EPM basic prompts only | YES — Configurable reason lists, permanently audited |
| Approval-workflow gated elevation | NO | YES — ServiceNow, email, PM portal integration |
| MFA at point of endpoint elevation | NO — Intune MFA is cloud-resource–gated only | YES — Duo, MS Authenticator, TOTP |
| Application blocking at process level | PARTIAL — Via WDAC/AppLocker (complex, Win only, no UX) | YES — Purpose-built, all platforms, user exception workflow |
| Publisher cert + SHA256 hash filter | NO | YES — Combined multi-factor filter for tamper resistance |
| Child process elevation scoping | NO | YES |
Auditing & Compliance
| Capability | Microsoft Intune | Privilege Manager |
|---|---|---|
| Device compliance event log | YES — Core Intune capability | N/A |
| Per-application elevation audit log | NO | YES — Every decision, full metadata per event |
| Session screen recording | NO | YES — Policy-triggered, tamper-evident vault |
| SIEM real-time privilege event stream | PARTIAL — Compliance events via Sentinel/Log Analytics | YES — All elevation and block events, real time |
| Behavioral anomaly / privilege spike detection | NO — No process-level telemetry | YES — PM reporting + SIEM enrichment |
Platform Coverage
| Platform | Intune (Device Mgmt) | PM (Privilege Control) |
|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 / 11 | YES | YES |
| macOS (Sonoma, Sequoia) | YES — MDM management | YES — Full privilege control, native agent |
| Linux (RHEL, Ubuntu, Debian, SUSE) | NO — Not in Intune scope | YES — PAM integration, centralized sudoers |
| Azure Virtual Desktop sessions | YES — MDM profile delivery to AVD hosts | YES — App control within AVD session |
| iOS / Android | YES — MAM / MDM | N/A — PM covers desktop and server endpoints |
Recommended Architecture Summary Deploy Intune for device enrollment, compliance enforcement, patch management, and application deployment. Deploy Privilege Manager as the privilege control layer on top of Intune-managed endpoints — use Intune itself to distribute the PM agent. Use Entra ID security groups to target PM elevation policies. The two tools operate at different layers, reinforce each other, and together close the full endpoint security stack.
Module 10 of 10
Knowledge Check:
Five Questions
Five Questions
These questions test whether you can accurately position Intune and Privilege Manager to stakeholders, handle objections, and identify the correct tool for each class of endpoint security problem.
Question 01 / 05
A CISO states: "We're fully deployed on Intune — our endpoint security posture is covered." How do you respond?
Agree — Intune compliance policies provide full endpoint security
Intune covers device configuration and compliance posture. It does not enforce least privilege, control application elevation, provide process-level audit trails, or allow local admin removal without disruption. Privilege Manager fills those gaps as a complementary runtime security layer.
Recommend replacing Intune with Privilege Manager for complete coverage
Enable Defender for Endpoint — that closes the privilege control gap
CORRECT. The key distinction: Intune manages device state — compliance, configuration, patches. PM manages what processes can do on that device at runtime — elevation, blocking, audit. A perfectly Intune-compliant device can still have local admin rights that make it fully exploitable by ransomware. Intune and PM together close the complete attack surface.
Question 02 / 05
An IT director says: "We have Conditional Access MFA set up through Intune and Entra ID — MFA is covered." Is this accurate for endpoint privilege control?
Yes — Conditional Access MFA covers all privilege scenarios on managed devices
Partially. Conditional Access MFA fires at cloud resource authentication — when accessing Outlook, SharePoint, or Teams. It does not challenge users at the moment they attempt to elevate a process or run a privileged application on the local endpoint. Endpoint elevation MFA requires Privilege Manager.
No — Intune does not support MFA at all
Correct — no distinction exists between cloud and endpoint MFA events
CORRECT. Conditional Access MFA operates at the identity authentication layer — it fires when a user opens a cloud resource. A user who is already logged into their laptop and right-clicks to "Run as administrator" never triggers Conditional Access. That local elevation event requires a separate control — PM's built-in elevation MFA challenge, which fires at the exact moment the privilege escalation is requested.
Question 03 / 05
A security architect proposes using WDAC (Windows Defender Application Control) deployed via Intune instead of Privilege Manager for application control. What is the most significant limitation of this approach?
WDAC cannot be deployed through Intune
WDAC via Intune is Windows-only, requires significant policy authoring expertise, provides no user-facing exception request workflow, has no session recording capability, supports only allow/deny (not elevation modes), and offers no cross-platform privilege consistency. It handles application allow-listing on Windows; PM handles the full privilege management lifecycle across all platforms.
WDAC and PM are equivalent — either approach achieves the same outcome
WDAC is always the preferred solution because it is built into Windows
CORRECT. WDAC is a legitimate Windows security technology and can be part of a defense-in-depth approach. But it is not a PM replacement: Windows-only, no elevation mode (only allow/deny), no user-visible exception request mechanism, no justification capture, no time-boxed approval grants, no session recording, and no cross-platform parity. PM handles the full privilege management lifecycle — discovery, policy, elevation, audit, exceptions — across Windows, macOS, and Linux.
Question 04 / 05
A compliance auditor requires evidence that privileged application sessions were recorded on employee workstations. Which tool provides this, and how?
Intune — it records sessions when the device reports non-compliance
Both tools record sessions equivalently through their shared audit pipeline
Privilege Manager — it records screen activity during elevated application sessions, triggered by policy. Recordings are stored in the PM vault, are tamper-evident, and are associated with the specific elevation event, user, machine, and process that triggered recording.
Neither — session recording requires a separate dedicated PAM jump server solution
CORRECT. Intune logs that an app was deployed and whether the device is compliant — it has no visibility into what occurred during a privileged session on that device. PM's session recording is policy-triggered (e.g., "record any session where a user runs an elevated process matching this policy"), producing tamper-evident recordings stored in the PM vault. This satisfies PCI DSS Req 10, HIPAA audit controls, and SOX IT control requirements for privileged access monitoring.
Question 05 / 05
An organization wants to remove local admin rights from all endpoints but has previously failed — breaking key applications. What is the Privilege Manager approach to prevent this outcome?
Accept that some disruption is unavoidable when removing local admin
Keep local admin for the applications that require it — this is unavoidable
Deploy Intune EPM — it handles all elevation needs for local admin removal
Deploy PM in audit-only discovery mode first. Run for 2–4 weeks to inventory every application that currently requires admin rights. Build targeted elevation policies for each. Then remove local admin — applications continue to function via policy elevation, users experience no disruption, and the attack surface is eliminated.
CORRECT. The "we tried and it broke things" story is the single most common reason local admin rights persist in Intune-managed environments. PM's discovery-first workflow directly solves this: audit mode identifies exactly what needs elevation before anything is removed. Elevation policies are built for each legitimate item. Local admin is removed after verification. Users run their tools — elevated transparently by PM — without holding admin accounts. The ransomware attack surface disappears. Helpdesk elevation tickets typically drop 40–60% because structured self-service replaces ad-hoc admin calls.
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out of 5 correct